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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2006, Conrad Hewitt, the chief accountant at the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), promised that the issue of
complexity in accounting would be addressed early in 2007 and would be a
leading focus of work by his office in 2007.' The goal in financial reporting
is to disseminate transparent, understandable, financial information that
fairly presents the financial condition of the reporting company.2
Oftentimes, however the information public companies disseminate is
overly complex,3 quagmired in legalistic form at the expense of true
economic substance, and is devoid of conveying true, meaningful and
understandable information regarding the company.4
In this regard, the SEC, in conjunction with the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), is making an attempt to remedy this problem by
exploring ways to simplify the fragmented and complex accounting regime
currently in existence.' The goal of this Article is to highlight one aspect of
this reform effort that must be addressed to insure success of the SEC's
stated objective of a more simplified accounting and financial reporting
system. The aspect in question is management and its role in the accounting
and financial reporting process.
Corporate management is primarily responsible for a company's finan-
cial reporting.6 This dynamic, at times, can put the interests of those who
prepare financial statements at odds with the users of such information. The
conflict stems from the structure of executive compensation. For many
corporate executives, a significant portion of their compensation is
incentive-based, i.e. tied to the company's financial performance.7 Thus, a
Steve Burkholder, SEC's Hewitt SaysAccounting Complexity is 'High Priority' IssueforAgency in
2007, SEC. L. DAILY, Dec. 8,2006.
2 Rachel McTague, Pozen Named to Head SEC Advisory Panel To Address Financial Reporting
Complexity, SEC. L. DAILY, June 28, 2007.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB RESPONSE TO SEC STUDY ON
ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND
TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 7 (Feb. 2006), available at
http;//www.fasb.org/articles&reports/fasb response sec study obs.pdf[hereinafter FASBRESPONSE].
5 McTague, supra note 2.
6 See, e.g., HOME DEPOT, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 35, available at
http//ir.homedepot.con/downloads/HD_2005 AR.pdf [hereinafter HD 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]
(including an audit opinion note that the Consolidated Financial Statements are the responsibility of the
company's Management).
See, e.g., HOME DEPOT, PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE OF 2006 ANNUAL MEETING OF
SHAREHOLDERS 32, available at http'//ir.homedepot.com/downloads/hd2006proxy.pdf [hereinafter HD
PROXY STATEMENT 2006].
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corporate manager's bonuses, stock options, or even continued employment,
might be linked to the figures reported in its financial statements.'
Because of this Incentive Based Compensation (IBC) component,
management, in many cases, may be adversely affected if the reported
financial results are unfavorable; stock options may not be as valuable for
example, or an executive's bonus that is based on corporate profitability may
not be realized if certain financial benchmarks are not met.9 This Article
contends that these types of conflicts create the disincentive for management
to report financial information accurately when that information is less than
favorable.
Accordingly, this conflict, if not properly addressed, will make the goal
ofa less complicated accounting regime remain a mere aspiration rather than
an achievable objective. The trappings of IBC incentivize managers to
engage in either aggressive accounting tactics that compromise financial
statement integrity, or to commit outright accounting fraud. ° Conse-
quently, accounting standard-setters are forced to draft standards
"defensively" in anticipation of, and in reaction to, financial preparers who
want to push the limits of accounting boundaries as far as possible to further
their own personal stakes. 1 This Article contends that the move to a more
simplified accounting and financial reporting regime can only be achieved
when this tension between preparers and users of financial information is
alleviated. To that affect, the Article will proceed as follows. Section II
provides context and frames the debate by explaining the tension-causing
link between IBC and financial reporting. Section III then explores the
resulting effect that IBC has had on accounting standards. Section IV then
discusses the likely changes to the accounting and financial reporting
framework and the potential obstacles that may make such an undertaking
difficult. Section V then proposes some solutions to the problem of IBC
and its adverse affects on accounting standards, the gist of which is to realign
8 See, e.g., id. at 33 (noting that potential bonuses, etc. are contingent upon the company
achieving certain earnings per share goals).
9 See, e.g., id. (noting that potential awards are payable only if the Company achieves specified
levels of average diluted earnings per share).
10 Robert A Prentice, The Inevitability ofa Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 775,782 n.34 (2006)
(citing Tom Horton, Tone at the Top: There Is Nothing More Important for the Board to Care About, and to
Assess, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 2002, at 8).
11 See, e.g., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATION No. 46:
CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITES--AN INTERPRETATION OF ARB NO. 51 (Dec.
2003), available at http;//www.fasb.org/st/summary/fisum46r.shtml [hereinafter INTERPRETATION 46(R)
SUMMARY]. Interpretation 46(R), in essence, broadened the criteria under which a Special Purpose
Entity (SPE) would have to be recorded on a consolidated bases, thereby capturing on the sponsoring
entity's books the debt obligation incurred by the SPE. Id.
"CARROT" APPROACH
management's incentives by incentivizing accurate financial reporting
instead of tying IBC to financial performance. Finally, Section VI concludes
by summarizing the argument and re-urging the practice of incentivizing
accurate financial reporting.
II. LAYING OUT THE PROBLEM-THE TENSION BETWEEN
PREPARERS AND USERS OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION
A. The Link Between Financial Statements, Executives, and
Shareholders-Some Context
A fundamental tension exists between preparers and users of financial
information which adversely affects the financial reporting process. Every
publicly held company has essentially two factions whose personal fortunes
are tied to the corporation's. The first faction, referred to as the "internal
faction," consists of the corporation's employees and includes, among
others, its executive officers such as the chief executive officer, the chief
financial officer, and the chief operating officer. The second faction, the
"external faction," is comprised of the corporation's shareholders.
Corporate employees are tasked to produce the goods or provide the services
that generate the profits on which the corporation and its factions will
subsist. Theoretically, the better the employees are at providing whatever
service it is they provide or good they produce, the more money the
company makes, and the better off employees are individually and
collectively due to their affiliation with a profitable and stable company.
The stake of the external faction in a corporation is premised in part
upon how that corporation is perceived by the market. 12 If the market's
perception is positive, then that favorable outlook is generally reflected by
an increase in that corporation's share price. However, if the market's
perception is negative, the poor perception will likewise be reflected by a
corresponding drop in the corporation's share price. Within this context,
financial statements that show steady increases in profit and consistently
meet forecasts will find more favor with investors than financial statements
that do not demonstrate such favorable indicators. 13 The focus then is to
12 This statement merely recognizes the adage, "perception is reality." In this context, if an
investor perceives a company to be a sound investment, based on for example what was reported in its
financial statements, the stock price will be reflected accordingly even though the true economic reality
may be very different.
13 Ofcourse, things other than financial performance can affect a company's share price as well
such as general industry or market trends which can have either a favorable or adverse affect on a
corporation's share price as well. This simplistic model is used simply to illustrate the point.
2008]
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appreciate how IBC is tied into this equation and, more pointedly, how IBC
creates tension in the financial reporting process which may lead to
aggressive accounting tactics that distort a corporation's true economic
position or even result in accounting fraud.
B. Incentive-Based Compensation
At its most basic level, IBC occurs where all or a portion of an
employee's compensation is based on the employee reaching some
benchmark or pre-determined performance level.' 4 The benchmarks in
question can take on myriad forms from particular unit output levels of a
division to a corporation's overall profitability. The forms of IBC relevant
to our discussion, however, are the ones that are tied to a corporation's
financial statements. It is recognized that even in this subset of IBC there
can be a number of variations. There are three common IBC forms.
Stock options are an incentive-based form of compensation designed to
link an employee's individual fortunes to the corporation's stock price.15 On
a specific date, the grant date, an employee is granted the right to purchase
a specified number of shares where the purchase will occur at some
designated future point in time, the exercise date. 6 The stock will have a
share price on the grant date as dictated by the market. When the exercise
date arrives, the employee with the stock option has the right to purchase
those shares at the price at which the shares were valued on the grant date.
Accordingly, if the value of the shares has risen between the grant date and
the exercise date, then the employee is rewarded by the increased value in
the stock.'7
The theory behind stock option grants is that the employee will seek to
maximize the value of his stock options by working hard between the grant
date and the exercise date to increase the stock's value as much as possible.'"
This, of course, is only the theory behind granting stock options. In many
cases, the theory and practice of stock option grants come together in
harmony and the practice works as contemplated. The employee is granted
the stock option, the employee works hard on the corporation's behalf to
14 See, e.g., HD PROXY STATEMENT 2006, supra note 7, at 33 (noting that potential bonuses, etc.
are contingent upon the company achieving certain earnings per share goals).
15 National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee Stock Options Fact Sheet,
http'/www.nceo.org/library/optionfact.htn-l (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Employee
Ownership].
16 See, e.g., STEVEN M. BRAGG, ACCOUNTING REFERENCE DEsKToP 211-12 (2002).
17 Employee Ownership, supra note 15.
Is BRAGG, supra note 16, at 211-12.
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increase the corporation's stock price, the value of the shares increase, and
the employee is rewarded accordingly. t9
Another incentive-based form of compensation is profit sharing. Profit-
sharing is more straight forward than the stock option plan. With a profit-
sharing plan, a corporate manager or executive shares in the corporation's
profits (or more accurately stated, its reported profits). 2° For example, an
executive may receive a base salary plus a percentage of the corporation's
reported income.
Finally, an executive may simply receive a bonus tied to some
benchmark. This benchmark could be any number of variables, such as gross
earnings, sales, net income, or stock price.
C. The Pressures on Financial Reporting-The Discordant Incentives
The recurring theme in each of the compensation structures mentioned
above is that an executive's compensation is tied to the company's reported
financial performance. In theory, tying an executive's compensation to his
corporation's financial performance is a good thing. The underlying idea is
that the manager now has a vested interest in the company's fortunes with
the executive's personal compensation tied to the corporation's fortunes as
a whole. Accordingly, the theory is that the executive will work harder to
make the corporation profitable while simultaneously increasing his personal
fortune at a proportional rate.
The problem with this theory, however, is that there are assumptions
built into the paradigm which over time have proven to be flawed. One
flawed assumption is that corporate executives and managers will act
ethically and honestly while trying to achieve these benchmarks. When the
corporation is in fact profitable and there is no earnings pressure on the
manager, the IBC model will work as designed, creating a "win-win"
situation for the executive and corporation alike.
But what happens when the fickle tastes of the public consumer change
and the product that was once a "can't miss" is now on the fast track to
obsolescence? What happens when what was thought to be the business
model of the future turns out not to be the revenue generating juggernaut
it was touted to be? What happens when that corporate executive, who has
grown so accustomed to his bonus that he has already spent it before it has
19 It must be acknowledged, however, that an increase (or fall for that matter) in a company's
share price can be primarily or exclusively due to general market or economic conditions that may have
nothing to do with the company's performance or the executives that run it.
20 For a basic definition of profit-sharing, see BRAGG, supra note 16, at 533.
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been awarded, faces the prospect that he may not earn a similar bonus this
year? What might a CEO do when a third consecutive quarter of stagnant
or declining earnings may mean not only losing his bonus, but also his job?
These hypothetical "what if's illustrate the dynamic that has proven to
be problematic. What the incentive-based paradigm fails to consider is the
"self-preservation" factor of the equation and the "risk-reward" model that
many corporate executives appear to be invoking when faced with the two
less than desirable alternatives. What IBC unwittingly does in many
situations is create a dynamic of "discordant incentives."2' Discordant
incentives occur when a corporate executive is faced with the proposition of
reporting financial information that, if reported accurately, would have an
adverse financial effect on him personally. 22 At thisjuncture, the executive
is faced with two alternatives: either (1) report the actual earnings results and
suffer the economic harms that stem from such news; or (2) generate the
additional revenue needed to make the bonus threshold, even if this entails
fraudulent means. Accordingly, an unintentional by-product of IBC is a
situation where those that are responsible for financial reporting, namely
management, now have a disincentive to report that information accurately
because management stands to be adversely affected on a personal level by
doing so.
D. The Decision to Engage in Aggressive or Fraudulent Accounting Tactics-
Playing the Probabilities
The United States has a complex and layered regime of standard-setters,
complex and thorough accounting rules, as well as layers of oversight built
into the financial reporting process to make sure that corporations produce
financial statements that fairly present their financial position.23  For
21 See, e.g., Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, Do Executive Stock Options Generate Incentives for
Earnings Management? Evidence from Accounting Restatements 3 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Author).
22 For example, imagine a situation where 25% of an executive's total compensation is tied to
the corporation reaching a revenue number of $40 million and they are $6 million short. The executive
has a strong incentive to somehow "manufacture" an additional $6 million in revenue instead of
reporting the actual financial results because the executive stands to lose 25% of compensation unless the
benchmark is achieved.
23 "[A]ccounting, auditing, and reporting guidance has grown to encompass thousands of
pronouncements that make up U.S. generally accepted accounting and auditing standards and SEC rules,
regulations and interpretations governing financial reporting. These range from major standards on
broad topics such as accounting for business combinations, to guidance on accounting practices for
specific industries to narrow interpretations and rulings on particular transactions." Robert H. Hertz,
Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Remarks at the 2005 AICPA National Conference on
Current SEC and PCAOB Reporting Developments 4 (Dec. 6, 2005).
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example, all publicly held companies are required to file quarterly and
annual financial reports with the SEC.24 Each report must include financial
information that is audited by an independent certified public accountant.25
Our current accounting regime has an accounting pronouncement, bulletin,
or standard for what seems to be any accounting issue imaginable. 26 The
FASB has at last count enshrined Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) into three volumes comprising some 4,530 pages. 27 Some of the
FASB rules run to over 700 pages on how to book a single transaction.2 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002, which, among other things, requires
CEOs and CFOs to certify that the financial reports of their companies
"fairly present[], in all material respects, the financial condition and results




With this backdrop and the seemingly broad range of checks and
balances that surround the financial reporting process, it would seem that a
corporate manager would be hesitant to be a part of a willful financial
statement misrepresentation. Yet in spite of this, many corporate executives
are choosing to push the boundaries set by the accounting standards and are
engaging in aggressive accounting practices that, while technically compliant,
nonetheless distort a corporation's true economic picture and some
corporate executives even choose the more egregious step of engaging in
accounting fraud in spite of the well-publicized risks of doing so.
Why do managers and executives choose to take such risks? For a
considerable period of time, economists theorized that executives would not
engage in such behavior because getting caught could destroy their
reputations. It became clear during the 1990s, however, that this argument,
although sound in theory, was wrong in practice. 30 "CEOs manipulated
their companies' earnings, paid themselves huge amounts of options, and
24 15 U.S.C S 78m(a)(1) (2006).
25 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry;
http/ /www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (noting that audited financial statements is one ofthe requirements
in the financial reporting process) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
26 For example, the FASB has over 160 financial accounting standards, 7 financial accounting
concepts, and 48 financial interpretations. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Pronouncements
and EITF Abstracts, http://www.fasb.org/st/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
7 Walter Wriston, The Solution to Scandals? Simpler Rules, WALL ST.J., Aug. 5,2002, at A-10.
2S Id.
29 18 U.S.C. S 1350 (2006).
30 Prentice, supra note 10, at 783; see also FRANKPARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT
AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 188-89 (2003). When Officers were controlling
shareholders, things could get even worse, as was the case for Hollinger International, Inc., where
controlling shareholders looted $400 million from the company. See Hollinger Inc. Says S.E. C. May Bring
a Civil Lawsuit Against It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at C2.
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established cozy relationships with their accountants and securities analysts,
but they did not acquire bad reputations-at least not until several years
later."3  The answer to the executive's actions goes back to the "self-
preservation" theory and the "risk-reward" model mentioned earlier. When
a corporate executive, faced with the prospect of what to do with less than
favorable results, chooses to employ aggressive accounting tactics or to
engage in outright accounting fraud, the executive chooses a calculated risk.
He makes a risk-reward assessment and concludes that the potential rewards
from employing aggressive accounting tactics or engaging in accounting
fraud outweigh the risks in doing so. This is not to say that this executive
actually performs a statistical probability analysis by calculating the
probability of getting caught engaging in accounting fraud. But it does
appear as if the driving force behind an executive's decision-making process
includes the perceived likelihood of the consequences that might result from
choosing to engage in either aggressive accounting or accounting fraud
rather than reporting poor results accurately.
1. ALTERNATIVE ONE-ACCURATE FINANCIAL REPORTING
Executives immediately experience the personal financial consequences
of reporting less than favorable financial results in an IBC environment. For
example, if a corporation has implemented a profit-sharing, bonus, or stock
option compensation model, reporting less than favorable financial results
reduces an executive's compensation. With the profit-sharing or bonus
compensation models, an executive may not be entitled to the profit-sharing
or bonus part of his compensation if those pre-determined benchmarks are
not met.32 Likewise, under a scenario where an executive receives a portion
of her compensation through stock options, poor financial results are usually
reflected by a corresponding drop in the corporation's share price and
therefore a corresponding decrease in value of the executive's stock options.
Even further, and on a broader scale, an executive whose corporation is
performing poorly may face the prospect of losing not only the incentive-
based portion of his compensation but also his employment could be in
jeopardy as well; especially in this current corporate climate where
corporations have less and less patience when they perceive that a CEO is
performing poorly. Ours is now a society that seeks immediate gratification.
Shareholders no longer seem willing to endure a short-term drop in share
price for the prospect of reaping rewards in the long run. With this myopic
31 Prentice, supra note 10, at 783-784.
32 See, e.g., HD PROXY STATEMENT 2006, supra note 7, at 33 (noting that potential awards are
payable only if the Company achieves specified levels of average diluted earnings per share).
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view, any "blips" on the financial radar screen create a wave of urgency
through that organization with the CEO and his executive team being
caught in its wake. Consequently, when a corporation's share price falls, the
CEO is faced with immediate and unending pressure to return the share
price to an upward trend. Oftentimes this mandate is given without regard
to the means by which this is done as long as the end objective is met.33
2. CHOOSING ALTERNATIVE TWO-EMPLOY AGGRESSIVE
ACCOUNTING TACTICS OR ENGAGING IN OUTRIGHT ACCOUNTING
FRAUD
Alternative two actually involves two possible courses of conduct.
Executives can either employ aggressive accounting tactics or engage in
outright accounting fraud. Each of these sub-choices comes with its own set
of issues. In contrast to the first alternative (accurate financial reporting),
alternative two presents a very different set of risks, probabilities and
consequences. The corporate executives who choose to engage in
accounting fraud potentially face a host of criminal and civil violations that
range from returning any profits made from ill-gotten gains, to considerable
jail time. 4 There should not be much debate as to which of the two
alternatives, accurate reporting versus financial fraud, carry the more dire
consequences. Yet when corporate executives are faced with the prospect of
deciding between one of the two alternatives, many choose alternative two.
Why might this be? Many studies have explored the impact of performance-
based compensation on misreporting.35 A significant number of the studies
are empirical in nature, citing the correlations between performance-based
compensation and the corporation's tendency to misreport financial
information. One particular study focused on CEO compensation
exclusively, citing the fact that "aggressive accounting practices would not
be adopted without the explicit or implicit consent of the CEO."36 The
study concluded that the likelihood of corporate misreporting was higher if
33 For example, for a transcript where moderator and panelists are discussing Enron's corporate
culture which served as a breeding ground for unethical, and illegal behavior from its employees, see
NOW Transcript (Aug. 12, 2005), http;'/www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcriptNOW132_full.html.
34 For example, former Cendant Corporation Chairman Walter A. Forbes, convicted in 2006
of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and making false statements to federal securities regulators, was
sentencedJanuary 17,2007 to twelve years and seven months in prison and ordered to pay $3.275 billion
in restitution. Martha Kessler, Former Cendant Chairman Forbes Sentenced to 12 Years, 7 Months in Prison,
SEC. L. DAILY, Jan. 18, 2007.
35 See, e.g., Natasha Burns & Simi Kdia, The Impact of Pelormance-Based Compensation on
Misreporting, 79J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2006).
36 Id. at 41.
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significant portions of the CEO's compensation was in the form of stock
options.37 The study looked at the years in which a corporation was required
to restate its earnings due to irregularities and years in which no restatements
were required. 38 The study found that in the years when the firms were
required to restate their earnings, on average, 60% of the CEO's
compensation was in the form of stock options.39 In those instances when
no restatements were required, on average, only 46% of the CEO's
compensation was in the form of stock options. 40 Misreporting occurred
most often when the personal stakes were higher for the CEO by virtue of
the proportionately higher share of compensation coming in the form of
stock options. What the study did not say, however, was the motivation
behind the CEO's actions and why they were willing to take such risks. The
exact motivations behind human decision making, especially in the high
stakes world of public companies, would no doubt make for fascinating
literature and reading. Such analysis, however, is neither the scope nor
focus of this Article, but merely one of the variables to be considered in the
process.
Returning to the issue of why executives take the risk of engaging in
accounting fraud or reporting financial information accurately, the answer
seems to lay in the probability of the consequences between the two
alternatives. When a corporate executive chooses to report unfavorable
financial information accurately, as discussed earlier, the consequences can
be immediate and certain. But if a corporate executive chooses to employ
aggressive accounting tactics, the executive is actingwithin the law's confines
and has committed no violation. Further, in the more extreme case of
accounting fraud, the consequences are not as certain. Statistically speaking,
the likelihood is low that a corporate executive's "book-cooking" antics will
be discovered. In spite ofwhat we would like to believe, our current "Gate-
Keeping" regime is ill-equipped to discover accounting misstatements where
management is intent on hiding such misstatements. There are over 13,000
publicly held corporations4 regulated by the SEC, which has approximately
3,100 employees.42 An even smaller number of SEC employees have the
37 Id. at 35.
38 Id. at 36.
39 Id. at 52 tbl.3.
40 Id.
41 Deloitte, The IASB and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
httpV/www.iasplus.corn/restruct/restsec.htn (lastvisited Mar. 10, 2008) (noting that 1,150 ofthe 13,000
companies registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission are non-US companies).
42 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http/www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 10., 2008). The SEC consists of five
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task of overseeing and regulating these publicly held companies. 43
Accordingly, with the odds statistically in the executive's favor, many seem
to be taking the calculated risk of engaging in accounting fraud at the risk of
what might happen versus reporting unfavorable financial information
accurately and facing the more immediate and certain consequences of lost
compensation at the very least and loss of job at the further end of the
spectrum.
Therefore, in theory, IBC appears to be a smart way to align the
employee's fortunes with the corporation's. But these compensation forms
are based on the flawed assumption that management will try to achieve
these benchmarks honestly and ethically. What actually happens in practice
is that IBC creates a situation of discordant incentives that force corporate
executives to choose between the goal of accurate financial reporting and the
corporate executives' own personal fortunes.
3. AGGRESSIVE ACCOUNTING TACTICS VS. ACCOUNTING
FRAUD-NOTING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
The practices df employing aggressive accounting tactics and committing
accounting fraud are similar in terms of a manager's motivation behind
employing one or the other, that motivation being to paint a company's
financial portrait in as favorable a light as possible. Yet the two practices are
unique in terms of their severity and degree of departure from GAAP, as
well as the potential consequences to the perpetrators if they are caught.
A. AGGRESSIVE ACCOUNTING TACTICS
Although aggressive accounting tactics involve engaging in accounting
practices that press against the confines of GAAP, it is important to note that
engaging in such tactics is not a GAAP violation, and employing aggressive
accounting tactics will not result in legal consequence to those who use
them. However, the discussion regarding aggressive accounting tactics is
important because it shows the nexus between the vested self-interest that
executives have in financial information that stems from IBC and the
accounting standards within which preparers of financial information are
supposed to navigate. Because of the vested interest that managers have in
presenting financial information as favorably as possible, the manager's focus
presidentially-appointed Commissioners, four Divisions and eighteen Offices. Id. With approximately
3,800 staff, the SEC is small by federal agency standards. Headquartered in Washington, DC, the SEC
has eleven Regional Offices throughout the country. Id.
43 See id.
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will not be on preparing user friendly, clear, and materially correct financial
statements. Instead, the manager will be as aggressive as possible while still
remaining within the confines of GAAP.
Because of this tension, accounting standard-setters are forced to draft
accounting standards defensively as a counter-measure to the aggressive
accounting tactics executives seek to employ. What is the end result?
Instead of accounting standards that are drafted and designed to provide
users with clear, accurate, and meaningful financial information, the
standards produce financial statements that, although compliant with the
bright-line tests set forth in the accounting rules, nonetheless are distorted
and fail to give a meaningful depiction of that company's true economic
position. The executive's vested personal interest is based on what is
purported in those financial statements. Accordingly, the executive's focus
may be diverted from getting the financials "right" to merely keeping them
compliant with GAAP while trying to paint the company's financial portrait
in as favorable a light as possible. Illustrations of how this can play out in
actual financial reporting will be discussed later in Section III.
B. FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTING TACTICS
Fraudulent accounting tactics is the same idea but taken to an elevated
level. Fraudulent accounting tactics occur when the corporation inten-
tionally presents financial information that is a material departure from its
true financial position. Some of the more common transgressions are the
acts of reporting fictitious revenue, and manipulatingvarious assets, liability,
or expenses to boost financial statement results." In the case of both
aggressive and fraudulent accounting tactics, the argument is that the
motivation behind employing either tactic is to further the executive's own
self interest in what is reported in the financials. Therefore, the tension of
IBC can taint the manager's motivations in preparing accurate and useful
financial information.
M. THE RESULTING EFFECT ON ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
The current accounting and regulatory regime is fragmented, compli-
cated, and extremely costly.45 The root cause of these phenomena is what
will be referred to as the "stick-based" approach to accounting standard
setting, an approach that to date has been employed either due to expediency
Matt Krantz, Capitalizing on Oldest Trick in the Book, USA TODAY, June 27, 2002, at 3B.
45 See generally Burkholder, supra note 1.
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or the belief that such an approach is the most effective means by which to
enforce accounting standards.
Presently, we do not have accounting rules and guidance that are
designed to produce financial statements that are complete, accurate, and
fairly represent the financial position of their respective companies. Instead,
the current regime is merely designed to "reign in" corporate managers who
will be as aggressive as possible in those areas of financial reporting that will
serve their personal interests such as revenue recognition, assets, and
inventory valuations, and will downplay those areas where full and fair
disclosure may be adverse to the corporate manager; namely, areas such as
expenses, liabilities, and debt obligations. An inherent tension exists in the
financial reporting process. The corporate manager will be as aggressive as
possible when it is in his best interest to do so and will likewise be as
conservative as possible when it is in his best interest to do so.
As a result, a corporate manager's approach to financial reporting is "how
aggressive can I be without running afoul of GAAP." Under this approach,
the goal of an executive is not fair and accurate reporting that effectively
presents the true economic position of that corporation, but instead is one
of mere technical compliance with the executive being as aggressive as
possible if it is in his best interest to do so. Because of this ever present
tension between the preparers of the financial statements and the standard-
setters that regulate them, a scenario of "move/counter-move" emerges.
Executives may take an aggressive position with an accounting matter that
is technically correct but substantively misleading. In reaction to this
phenomena, the standard-setters draft additional guidance, interpretations,
or standards to curtail the aggressive stance management has taken. The
standard-setters make a better mousetrap, and then management merely
counters by making a better mouse.4 6 The move/counter-move between the
two factions has resulted in the currently quagmired, expensive, and
complicated accounting regime presently in place. Some examples will
illustrate the point.
A.. Accounting for Leases-Operating versus Capital
Some of the potential "big ticket" items on a corporation's balance sheet
are expenditures related to the procurement of property, plant, or
46 For example, Financial Interpretation 46(R) was enacted following Enron's abuse of the
Special Purpose Entity (SPE). It broadened the criteria under which sponsoring entities would be
required to report SPEs with whom the sponsoring entity was affiliated on a consolidated basis, such that
the sponsoring entities potential debt obligations would be reflected in its financial statements, something
Enron failed to do prior to FIN 46(R). See INTERPRETATION 46(R) SuMMARY, supra note 11.
20081
242 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:227
equipment.47 These items will be used for 5 to 45 years.48 The cash outlay
related to these assets can be considerable. Instead of purchasing these items
outright, corporations will typically lease them on a long-term basis.
Accordingly, the method used to account for these long-term lease
obligations can have a significant impact on a corporation's financial reports.
The threshold question and major issue with respect to long-term lease
obligations is whether the transaction will be accounted for as an operating
lease or a capital lease.49 The decision is significant. If the transaction is a
capital lease, the corporation must account for the transaction as if the
corporation is acquiring the asset, which in turn entails reporting a long-
term debt obligation on its balance sheet.to This election further affects
many key financial ratios that analysts use to determine the corporation's
financial health.51 Alternatively, if the transaction is an operating lease, the
corporation need only expense the lease payments in the period in which
those expenses were incurred, with no long-term debt obligation reflected
on its balance sheet.5 2 The lower the reported debt obligation, the better the
corporation's perceived financial health and such perception will produce a
corresponding increase in the market price for its shares. As a result, the
accounting treatment for any long-term lease transaction becomes a high-
stakes game with significant consequences depending on the accounting
treatment afforded as dictated by the transaction's nature.
1. THE TENSION DRIVES THE NECESSITY: RULES BASEDACCOUNTING
FOR LEASES-STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
No. 13
The tension between the corporate executive's self-interest and the
desire for accounting standard setters to have meaningful and accurate
financial reports creates a conflict. On one side, corporations and their
47 For instance, for fiscal year endingJanuary 29,2006, "Property, Plant & Equipment" (net of
accumulated depreciation) represented 56% of Home Depot's total assets. See HD 2005 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 37.
48 For example, for its "Buildings," Home Depot's depreciation ranges from ten to forty-five
years; for "Furniture, Fixtures and Equipment," three to twenty years; for "Leasehold Improvements"
five to thirty years. See id. at 42.
49 See generally, ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 13, It
6-7 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1976) [hereinafter FASB No. 13].
so Id. 1 10 at 9.
51 For example, a key analyst ratio is the debt to equity ratio, which measures the amount ofdebt
in relation to the corporation's equity. When a corporation is required to record a lease as a capital lease,
this ratio becomes less favorable.
52 FASB No. 13, supra note 49, 15 at 11.
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executive officers desire the operating lease accounting treatment whenever
and wherever allowed because this obviates the requirement that the
corporation record the lease as a long-term debt obligation on its balance
sheet.5 3 And on the other side, the accounting standard-setters push for
more rigid and onerous standards to capture the transaction's "economic
substance." This conflict resulted in Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 13 (SFAS 13). 4 Standard-setters were forced to draw lines
in the sand and set the outer boundary for operating lease accounting
treatment. Those lines resulted in the following four bright-line tests.
Under SFAS 13, the presence of any one of the following would disqualify
the transaction for the more favored operating lease accounting treatment:
I. Ownership transfers from the lessor to the lessee at the end
of the lease term."5
II. The lease contains a bargain purchase option.5 6
III. The lease term is equal to 75% or more of the asset's
estimated economic life. 7
IV. The present value of the minimum lease payments is equal
to 90% of the property's fair market value."
The presence of any one of these criteria triggers the less favored capital
lease accounting treatment. The rational is that any one of these criteria
"colors" the economic substance of the transaction to one where the
corporation is deemed to be purchasing the asset outright. The aim of SFAS
13 is to have that economic reality reflected in the accounting treatment for
that transaction. Accordingly, the key for financial statement preparers is to
structure their long-term lease obligations such that none of these criteria
are present.
2. How THESE BRIGHT-LINE TESTS CAN DISTORT FINANCIAL
REPORTING
But characterizing transactions in such a "cookie-cutter" fashion can
distort the-true economic substance of a company's financial portrait even
if it is compliant with the governing accounting standard. For example, take
53 See generally id.
34 Id.
55 Id. 7a at 8.
56 Id. 7b at 8.
57 Id. I 7c at 8.
58 Id I 7d at 8.
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the following lease transactions entered into by Company A and Company
B, respectively.
Company A leases a building. The lease term is equal to 74% of the
building's estimated economic life. The present value of the lease payments
is equal to 89% of the leased property's fair market value. The lease
transaction will not transfer ownership at termination of the lease term, nor
does the lease contain a bargain purchase option.
Company B also leases a building. The lease term is equal to 75% of the
building's estimated economic life. The present value of the lease payments
is equal to 90% of the leased property's fair market value. Similar to
Company A, the lease transaction will not transfer ownership at the end of
the lease term, nor does the lease contain a bargain purchase option.
Comparing these two transactions shows no discernible difference.
Both Companies A and B will be leasing an asset for almost three-quarters
of that asset's estimated economic life with only a one percent difference
between the two. Likewise, the present value of the lease payments differs
by only one percentage point. And neither transaction will transfer
ownership or contain an option to purchase the asset at a bargain price at the
lease's termination. But because of the rules-based bright-line tests set forth
in SFAS 13, the accounting treatment available for each of these two
transactions and the corresponding financial statement impact of the two
will be very different. s9
Because Company A managed to stay within SFAS 13's bright-line
criteria (albeit just barely), CompanyA will be able to account for its lease
transaction as an operating lease. This means that each year, Company A
will simply record the lease payments as an expense item in the year those
expenses are incurred. 6° CompanyA will not be required to record the lease
as an asset on its balance sheet in spite of the fact that Company A will be
making use of that asset for nearly three-quarters of the asset's life and for
essentially the same period of time Company B will be leasing its building.
Further, the amount that Company A will be making in lease payments is
nearly 90% of the leased property's fair market value. Finally, Company A
will not be required to record the corresponding debt obligation.6
In contrast, SFAS 13 requires very different accounting treatment for
Company B's transaction because of minute differences in the transaction's
characteristics. First, Company B will be required to capitalize the asset and
place the item on its balance sheet as a purchased asset because Company B
59 Id. 7a-d at 8.
60 Id. 15at 11.
61 Id
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will be deemed to have purchased the item.6 This is onerous because of the
corresponding debt obligation which will be equal to the present value of the
lease payments as measured at the lease's inception. 63
In short, this comparison illustrates how a rules-based approach can
result in very different accounting treatment for transactions that have
minute differences in their characteristics. A rules-based approach to
accounting standard-setting can move financial reporting further and further
away from the economic substance of a transaction and lead to a distorted
financial picture. However, as discussed above, the "push the envelope"
culture of financial reporting drives and necessitates such bright-line
accounting standards. When managers have vested interests in the outcomes
and how such transactions are reported, their focus may not necessarily be
on reporting the true economic substance of the transaction, but rather on
figuring out how they can present such transactions in the most favorable
light possible and still remain within the confines of GAAP. If the
accounting and financial reporting regime is to be simplified and improved,
this dynamic will have to be taken into consideration.
B. Accounting Fraud-The Story at Enron
At the further end of the spectrum is accounting fraud. With accounting
fraud, the specter of IBC still drives executives to present financials in the
best possible light. The use of fraudulent accounting tactics, however, seems
to occur when aggressive accounting tactics are no longer sufficient to
achieve the results needed or desired by management to reach the financial
benchmarks for which they are striving. Obviously, creating fictitious
revenue, for example, can have a more significant financial statement impact
than structuring a lease transaction as an operating lease versus a capital
lease. And not surprisingly, engaging in accounting fraud comes with a
much higher price. Depending on the type and magnitude of accounting
fraud being perpetrated, the accounting standard-setters react with
"defensive" accounting standards designed to "reign-in" such practices. But
as stated earlier, the end result is accounting standards that are quagmired,
expensive, complicated, and are- even of questionable effectiveness. The
following Enron story will help to illustrate.
Enron has been chronicled from many different perspectives, with
various aspects of its meteoric rise and fall dissected and analyzed in great
62 Id. lOat 9.
63 Id.
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detail. 4 The following discussion analyzes the nexus between the forms of
IBC that Enron executives were receiving and how the prospect of
executives losing millions in stock options and other forms of compensation
may have spawned innovative forms of accounting fraud. And then finally,
the accounting standard setter's reactive changes to accounting standards
enacted as countermeasures.
How does a company report that its operations are generating a healthy
and prolific flow of cash when in fact they are not? Enron's answer to this
question was its creative use--or more accurately its abuse-of a financing
vehicle referred to as a Special Purpose Entity (SPE). 65 This creative SPE
use was concocted by a select group of talented Enron executives with the
help of their independent auditors Arthur Andersen and its outside legal
counsel, Vinson & Elkins.6 The only problem was that their motivation was
squarely focused on generating a continued rise in the price of its shares
through financial engineering and accounting "sleight of hand" instead of
focusing on generating revenues from the actual business itself.
1. WHAT IS A SPE?
Though SPEs are complex and complicated entities, the general premise
is simple. SPEs are formed when a company creates a legal entity that is
separate and distinct from its core operation, for the purpose of staging a
discreet and isolated business venture, operation, or function.67 SPEs
narrow the scope of risk to the assets and liabilities placed in it such that
investors' or equity holders' fortunes will be based exclusively on what
occurs with the assets and liabilities placed within the SPE.6s
64 Seegenerally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOs AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport
& Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004), which has contributions from various authors ranging from accounting
insights to ethical perspectives.
65 Bala G. Dharan, Enron's Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future Enrons?, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 64, at 117.
6 See Final Report ofNeal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 39-49 In re Enron Corp., No.
01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003), available at httpV/141.150.158.82/media/Final_
Report NealBatson.pdf.
67 For a more detailed description ofSPEs, see Harold S. Peckron, Watchdogs that Failed to Bark:
Standards of Tax Review After Enron, FLA. TAX REV. 853, 857-58 (2002). A special purpose entity (SPE)
or vehicle is an entity (usually a limited company of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership)
created to fulfill narrow, specific or temporary objectives, primarily to isolate financial risk. Id.
68 Bala G. Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in ENRON AND BEYOND:
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES 104
(Julia K Brazelton & Janice L. Ammons eds., 2002).
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2. How ENRON ABUSED THE SPE STRUCTURE
Unquestionably, legitimate uses exist for the SPE, such as the
securitization of accounts receivable. 69 But the SPE structure, because of its
nature and form, can be abused by those intent on achieving accounting
results that are not rooted in economic substance. A chief example of abuse
is Enron. Through SPEs, Enron created revenue where there was none and
reported that its operations were generating cash flow that did not exist.
Finally Enron failed to report debt obligations that it actually incurred. All
of this was done through the manipulation of the SPE structure and Enron's
liberal interpretation of Financial Accounting Standard 140 (FAS 140).70
3. THE DARK COMES TO LIGHT
Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.71 Once the investiga-
tions into the Company's financial statement engineering commenced, the
full breadth and depth of its fraudulent accounting misdeeds came to light.
It was discovered that Enron used several different types of "accounting
techniques" to manipulate its financial statements, 2 and one of those
techniques involved the manipulation of the SPE in connection with FAS
140.73 Ordinarily FAS 140 transactions comply with Financial Accounting
Standard 140, which sets forth the accounting guidelines related to asset
69 A common SPE use is the securitization of Account Receivables. For example, a company
has $10,000 of account receivables on its books. The receivables come due in one year. But, the
company wishes to receive cash from those receivables today, versus one year from now. To address
accounting for this activity, the company forms an SPE, into which the account receivables are
transferred. The account receivables have now been isolated from the core operations. The SPE, in
turn, issues securities to investors, who buy the securities based on the assessed creditworthiness of those
outstanding receivables. The investors, for example, may pay $9,000 for the securities, which, in turn,
is paid to the company. The investors then wait the twelve months for the receivables to come due.
When the receivables are paid, the shareholders are entitled to the proceeds. This illustrates the "win-
win" situation for all parties involved: the company gets $9,000 on "day one" instead of having to wait
a year, and investors realize $1,000 profit after paying $9,000 on "day one" and receiving $10,000 twelve
months later. This is just one example of a legitimate and non-controversial use for SPEs.
70 See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 39, In re Enron
Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan; 21, 2003), available at http'//141.150.158.82/medi2/
2ndExaminersReport.pdf.
71 See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 69.
72 See id. at 37. Note that the Report explains the six accounting techniques Enron used in its
financial manipulation schemes, with the SPE used in conjunction with SFAS 140 being one of the
significant ones. The other five are explained in the report as well.
73 See id. at 39.
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transfers in connection with structured financings.74 But, Enron used FAS
140 transactions to boost its financial portrait improperly. For example, in
the year 2000, Enron increased its reported net income by $351.6 million,
36% of its reported net income.75 Appreciating the gravity of this statement,
36% of Enron's reported earnings in the year 2000 were not actual money
generated through its operations, but earnings "engineered" via the use of
the FAS 140 SPE transactions.
4. How IT WAS DoNE
In sum, Enron inflated its earnings and cash flows from operations by
(1) improperly recording transferred assets as sales even though Enron still
maintained control of the assets after their transfer; (2) reporting the
proceeds from those transfers as cash-flows from operations when Enron
should have recorded those items as secured borrowings; and (3) failing to
record debt obligations incurred through these transactions. When vetted
through a filtered lens, Enron's transgressions were clear. But of course,
hindsight is always perfect.
In addition to its core operations, Enron held a number of otherwise
illiquid assets that it used in connection with these FAS 140 transactions.76
One of the ways Enron was able to create fictitious revenue was through its
creative use of these equity investments. 7 To create a situation where it
could manufacture revenue, Enron formed subsidiaries, called "Asset
LLC's," and transferred its illiquid assets into those subsidiaries.78 The Asset
LLC in turn issued two classes of stock, Class A shares and Class B shares.7 9
The class A shares represented the Asset LLC's voting interests, whereas the
Class B shares represented the economic interest in the LLC.80 The Class
74 See ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND
EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES (AREPLACEMENTOF FASB STATEMENT No. 125), Statement ofFin.
Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) [hereinafter FASB No. 140].
75 Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 69, at 38.
76 "As part of these management efforts, Enron monetized several types of assets in the FAS 140
Transactions, including shares of common stock or warrants to purchase common stock ofboth publicly
traded and private companies, partnership interests, membership interests in limited liability companies
formed in connection with relationships between Enron and third parties and interests in trusts formed
in connection with other financial transactions undertaken by Enron." First Interim Report of Neal
Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 59, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
September 21, 2002), available at http'/141.150.158.82/media/lstExaminersReport.pdf.
7 See id. at 58. For example, the FAS 140 transactions cited in the report were referred to as
Cerberus, Nikita, Hawaii (I & II), and Backbone (I & II). See id. at 67, 91, 101, 117.
78 See id. at 59.
79 See id. at 59-60.
80 See id.
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A interests would be issued to Enron;"' the Class B shares containing the
economic interests would be issued to an SPE, generally a Share Trust
(Trust) that Enron formed and controlled. 2 The Class B interests sold to
the Trust were entitled to no voting rights but were entitled, instead, to
substantially all of the economic interests in the Asset LLC. 83
5. FOCUSING ON CASH FLOWS
But from where was the money coming? For Enron's facade to work,
it still needed an actual and tangible influx of cash flowing into the
corporation. To achieve this, financial institutions such as Citigroup, JP
Morgan, and Merrill Lynch (Lenders)84 provided cash infusions. The funds
that flowed into the Trusts came from two sources. The first source was the
Lenders themselves. These were borrowed funds with the Trust as the
indebted party.85 The second source was equity investors, "independent"
third parties who, coincidentally, were often an affiliate of the lending
institution that was a party to the transaction. 86
The money source stemming from the equity investors was entitled to
be repaid the amount of its investment plus an annual rate of return. The
amount of the equity interest in the Trust was equal to at least 3% of the
purchase price for the Class B interest, plus the amount of fees due to the
Lenders. The right of the equity-holder to receive payment with respect to
its equity was subordinated to the right of the Lenders to receive the
payment that was advanced under the credit facility.87 At the closing of the
FAS 140 transaction, the Trusts paid the Asset LLC the purchase price for




82 See id. at 60.
83 See id.
84 Oversight of Investment Bank's Response to the Lessons of Enron: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 7-10 (2002) (statement
of Senator Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. On
Homeland Sec.& Governmental Affairs), availableat http/hsgac.senate.gov/121102collinsstatement.htm.
85 First Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 76, at 60.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 60-61.
88 Id. at 61.
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6. ENRON'S IMPROPER ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
Enron improperly recorded these asset transfers to the Asset LLC's as
sales, which inflated revenue on its income statement.89 Also, depending
upon the assets involved, Enron recognized cash flow from these transfers
as cash flows from operating activities.90 With structured financings properly
in accordance with FAS 140, the transferring entity must completely
relinquish itself from any rights to profits that could be realized from the
transferred asset once the presumptive sale occurs. 91  Likewise, the
transaction must be structured in a way such that the sponsoring entity is
absolved from any potential liability if the SPE fails to realize the payments
from the transferred assets. 92
Enron's accounting for the asset transfers as sales was not proper for
several reasons. First, Enron maintained control of the transferred asset
through its ownership of the Class A voting membership interests in the
LLC to which the asset was transferred. Second, Enron acted as guarantor
on the Trust's behalf through a mechanism referred to as a "total return
swap." 93 The total return swap was a guarantee of payment in the (likely)
event the payment streams from the transferred assets were insufficient to
service the debt obligation and repay the Lenders. 94 Indeed, the share price
needed to remain high so that the IBC maintained its value and executives'
stakes in the outcome would not be jeopardized. In effect, IBC spawned
financial fraud, which then spurred reaction by the accounting standard-
setters.
In sum, Enron inflated its earnings and cash flows from operations by
(1) improperly reporting transferred assets over which Enron still
maintained control as sales and (2) by reporting the proceeds from the sales
as cash-flows from operations when in fact they should have recorded those
items as secured borrowings. In addition, it was improper for Enron not to
record the money received from the Lenders as debt obligations because
Enron guaranteed payment of the money through the total return swaps.
89 See id. at 53.
90 See id.
91 FASB No. 140, supra note 74, 5 at 7.
92 Id.
93 First Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 76, at 54.
94 See id.
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7. THE PLAYERS BEHIND THE PLAN AND THE INCENTIVES THAT
DROVE THEM
At its zenith, Enron was a monolithic company, spanning over 20
countries, employing over 30,000 people, and controlling more than $62
billion in assets. 95 In spite of its size, the magnificent accounting fraud that
it perpetrated was orchestrated by a relatively small number of individuals.
These were individuals who had access to the levers that controlled Enron's
financial reporting process, as well as the power and influence to insure that
such financial manipulation went undetected for quite some time.
How did IBC lead to the financial accounting fraud that was exacted by
Enron's executive officers? At the outset, any attempt to show "he did X
because ofY" is difficult to demonstrate with absolute certainty. Without a
clear and unequivocal confession, something to the effect of "I helped my
company commit financial fraud because I wanted to maximize the value of
my stock options and bonus payments," investigations are limited to drawing
plausible inferences based on the facts. Admittedly then, the case is
circumstantial, and quite likely a whole host of factors, notjust IBC, drove
the executive's actions in perpetrating financial fraud. At the root ofiEnron's
accounting fraud was a select group of high level executives. Jeffrey Skilling,
Kenneth Lay, Andrew Fastow, Richard Causey, and Ben Glisan commanded
most of the attention in the headlines in the aftermath of Enron's
bankruptcy in 2001. They are also the ones that were most integral in
perpetrating the accounting fraud.96
To say that Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling and the other executives
involved in the scandal were motivated exclusively by greed or the sole
desire for personal monetary gain would likely be an over simplification. As
with many issues, the root cause of human behavior and action can be hard
to ascertain. As complex creatures we continually buck behavioral models
such as the neo-classical "rational actor" when it comes to predicting and
anticipating human decision making and actions. This is especially so in
corporate settings where a host of factors and variables transcend upon that
95 Anastasia Kurdina, The Collapse of Enron: Managerial Aspect, http://www.personal-
writer.com/enron/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
96 The Houston Chronicle maintains a website that chronicles each executive's role in the
accounting scandal and their subsequent convictions and sentencing. See Enron Corp. - News, Trials
and the History of the Scandal, http//www.chron.com/news/specials/enron/ (last visited on Mar. 10,
2008) [hereinafter Enron Chronicle Special Website]. Skilling, Lay, Fastow, and Causey each got at least
five-year prison sentences with Skilling receiving a sentence of twenty-four years. Kenneth Lay's
sentence was vacated after his untimely death due to a heart attack, which he suffered in July of 2006.
Id. (details for sentencing and conviction of these key players can be found by following the hyperlinks
for each individual's name under the "Prosecution Scoreboard" section of the page).
20081
252 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 16:227
executive on a daily basis, with each variable effecting his outlook and
reactions in unpredictable ways. Scholars suggest that Enron's high level
executives had motives that were less than altruistic. As noted by one
scholar,
their job was notjust to make money, but to make the most money
-to be the superstar firm. For a superstar firm, success did not
mean merely doing better than the next firm. It meant destroying
the next firm and much of industrial organization along with it and
always delivering good numbers. 97
Thus, in that author's view it was this single-minded pursuit of besting all
others that ultimately caused its managers to destroy their firm.98
The bottom line, at least in Enron's case, is that the lines of what was
ethical and proper blurred. Consequently, the inner circle of executive's
moves to throw themselves "financial life-savers" while the ship was sinking
tells us that their personal financial stakes played a large role in their
decisions and actions. Concluding that the actions of Kenneth Lay and
"friends" were at least in part motivated by personal greed or gain would not
be a very great inferential leap.
Consider first Kenneth Lay, the CEO and Chairman of the Board from
1986 to 2001,99 the time period when Enron's financial misstatements were
most prevalent and during the time directly preceding its bankruptcy
filing.1"° Lay received approximately $300 million from the sale of Enron
stock options and restricted stock, netting over $217 million in profit, and
was paid more than $19 million in salary and bonuses.'0 ' During 2001 alone,
Lay received a salary of over $1 million, a bonus of $7 million, and $3.6
million in long term incentive payments." Additionally, during the period
of August 21 through October 26, 2001, Lay sold approximately 918,104
shares ofEnron stock to repay advances totaling $26,025,000 he had received
from a line of credit extended by Enron."103 If during those same periods in
which Mr. Lay exercised those stock options, Enron had reported its
97 William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1286-
87 (2002).
98 Id. at 1287.
99 Superseding Indictment at3, United Statesv. Causey, Cr. No. H-04-25 (S-2) (S.D. Texjuly
7, 2004), available at http'//www.chron.com/content/news/photos/04/07/08/layindict.pdf
100 First Interim Report of Neal Batson, suptra note 76, at 1.




financial position accurately, or at least within material limits, Lay's stock
options, bonuses, and perhaps his long term incentive payments would likely
have been worth substantially less than the amount for which he exercised
them.
A similar situation existed withJeffrey Skilling, Kenneth Lay's successor
as Enron CEO until his abrupt resignation in August of 2001,l°4just prior to
Enron's bankruptcy filing for "undisclosed personal reasons. "'05 Between
1998 and 2001, Mr. Skilling received approximately $200 million from the
sale of Enron stock options and restricted stock, netting over $89 million in
profit, and was paid more than $14 million in salary and bonuses."
Likewise,, between 1998 and 2001, Richard Causey, Enron's Chief
Accounting Officer'07 received more than $14 million from the sale ofEnron
stock and stock options, netting over $5 million in profit, and was paid more
than $4 million in salary and bonuses, before being fired in February 2002.108
While there is no unequivocal confession from any of these executives, we
can only infer that their personal stakes in the outcome played a role in the
decisions they made and the actions they took. But again, the inferential
leap is not a very long one.
C. How the Standard-Setters Reacted with the Birth of FIN 46(R); a New
Consolidation Criteria, an Attempt to Put SPEs back on the Books
Much like the public outcry that sparked the birth of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, a similar panic button was pressed regarding accounting
standards related to items such as the FAS 140 transactions. In fact, early in
his tenure, Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board Robert
Hertz bore the brunt of much Capitol Hill ire as he fielded questions on
how the problem of unrecorded liabilities and fictitious revenue funneled
through SPEs would be addressed, with one southern Senator asking, when
[the] FASB was going to "outlaw the use of these dummy co-poh-ray-shuns."' °9
104 Id. at 7.
105 Wendy Zellner, et. al.JeffSkilling: Enron's MissingMan-The CEO who Created Its In-Your-Face
Culture Has Been Largely Absent from the Inquiry, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Feb. 11, 2002,
httpV//www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_06/b3769051.htm.
106 Superseding Indictment, supra note 99, at 6.
107 Enron Chronicle Special Website, supra note 93 (follow hyperlink for "Richard Causey" in
the "Prosecution Scoreboard" section of the page).
108 Superseding Indictment, supra note 99, at 6.
109 Tim Reason,All in the Family: FIN 46Made CompaniesAdmit Paternity of Special Purpose Entities.
But It also Resulted in Some Surprise Adoptions, CFO MAG, Sept. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfn/3126336/c_3148382?f= options.
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Such heat sparked the birth of Financial Interpretation 46 which was later
refined as Financial Interpretation 46(R) (FIN 46(R)).
FIN 46(R) addresses situations where one company, Company A, has
a financial interest in another, Company B. FIN 46(R) outlines when and
under what circumstances the relationship between Company A and
Company B is such that GAAP would require the two to be reported on a
consolidated basis. The usual investment that would trigger this rule is
when Company A invests in Company B through stock ownership. Prior
to FIN 46(R), entities would be required to consolidate only in the instance
where Company A had majority ownership in Company B through
Company A's ownership of Company B's stock. This previous test was
treated as a bright-line that required consolidation only when Company A
was a majority owner of CompanyB's stock (i.e., greater than 50 percent)."1
As a result of this bright-line test, prior to FIN 46(R) corporations
would avoid the consolidation requirement by controlling the entity through
some means other than stock ownership and would avoid consolidation,
thereby keeping both the assets and, more importantly, any underlying
liabilities off CorporationA's balance sheet.' With SPEs, a special niche in
the accounting and regulatory framework was carved that made it possible
for entities such as Enron to form subsidiaries but nonetheless avoid
recognizing those entities on a consolidated basis. Such accounting "sleight
of hand" was achieved by relying on yet another accounting promulgation
known as Emerging Issues Task Force 90-15 (EITF 90-15). Under EITF
90-15, the sponsoring corporation could avoid consolidation as long as the
SPE had an additional "outside" equity investor whose investment in the
SPE was at least 3%. 112 FIN 46(R), among other things, was designed to
close this loophole."3 The first noteworthy change that FIN 46(R) made
was to broaden the scope of potential entities that would come under its
110 See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATrHEWJ. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 521 (3d ed.
2001).
II For example, the sponsoring company may control the SPE by narrowly defining the scope
of the SPEs permitted activities and placing such limitations in the SPEs chartering documents, such as
its Articles of Incorporation.
112 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE ISSUE NO. 90-15:
IMPACT OF NONSUBSTANTIVE LESSORS, RESIDUALVALUE GUARANTEES, AND OTHER PROVISIONS IN
LEASING TRANSACTIONS 1 (1991), available at http'//www.fasb.org/st/ (scroll down and follow the link
for full text of EITF 90-15) [hereinafter EITF 90-15]. Although not stated specifically in EITF 90-15,
industry practice had evolved to the point where three percent equity investment was sufficient at-risk
equity investment to avoid consolidation.
113 INTERPRETATION 46(R) SUMMARY, supra note 11.
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purview to include any entity that met the definition of a variable interest
entity (VIE)1 4
VIEs include SPEs and can be generally described as entities where the
equity investment at risk does not provide its holders with the characteristics
of a controlling financial interest or is insufficient for the entity to finance
its activities without additional subordinated financial support."' These
characteristics are meant to identify arrangements where control of the entity
would not be achieved through voting stock ownership but through some
other means." 6 FIN 46(R) requires consolidation of a VIE by a party that
has a majority of the risks and rewards associated with the entity." 7 FIN
46(R) also establishes a methodology for determining what party associated
with a VIE should consolidate the VIE. Essentially, the requirement is that
the party exposed. to a majority of the variation in the VIE's performance
outcomes both positive and negative should consolidate the VIE because
such exposure is likely to be indicative of control."' FIN 46(R) refers to
such a party as the VIE's "primary beneficiary." "'
An issuer's involvement or "variable interest" can manifest itself in debt
instruments, guarantees, service contracts, written put options, total return
swaps, or other instruments' ° These arrangements with a VIE can put the
issuer in a position akin to an equity holder in that the issuer bears the same
risks and rewards of the VIE as an equity holder would. For example,
consider an issuer that owns 49% of the voting stock of another entity and
is also that entity's sole debt guarantor. Before FIN 46(R), such an issuer
might not have been required to consolidate the other entity based upon
voting control alone because the 49% ownership falls short of the 51%
required for consolidation. But subsequent to the promulgation of FIN
46(R), if this same entity is deemed to be a VIE, then the issuer would be
required to consolidate due to the issuer's additional risk of loss from the
outstanding guarantee."'
114 Id.
115 CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTERESTENTITIES: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARB NO. 51,
Interpretation No. 46, 4 at 3-5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2003), available at
http/www.fasb.org/fin46r-marked.pdf [hereinafter FIN 46(R)I.
116 Id. 5 at 5-7.
11 Id. 14 at 12.
118 Id. 15 at 13.
119 Id.
120 Id. 2at 3.
121 Id. t 14 at 12.
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D. Was FIN 46(R) Really Necessary?
In tying FIN 46(R) back into the theme of IBC, financial reporting and
accounting standards, what existed was an environment in which a select
group of individuals; namely the executives at Enron, orchestrated a maze
of complex and complicated accounting transactions that had little, if any,
basis in economic substance. Each Enron executive profited personally
through inflated stock prices and their timely exercise of stock options. And
finally, on the heels of such pervasive and complex accounting fraud,
accounting standard-setters again were forced to react to such behavior
through the promulgation of "defensive accounting standards" like FIN
46(R).
What is problematic, however, is that the standard was drafted in a
defensive manner to cast a wide net with a tight mesh. This design was to
insure that "Enron-like" SPE abuse would not re-occur. But simultaneous-
ly, because of the expanded consolidation criteria, entities that have no
nefarious intent behind their SPE use are now likewise saddled with
interpreting and complying with FIN 46(R). Simply put, the incentive to
cheat results in cheating, which results in more rules to address the cheating,
and financial reporting becomes saddled with yet another compliance hurdle
that is complicated, complex, costly, and like many laws that are reactive in
nature, likely will not prevent what it was designed to prevent.
Enron's departure from GAAP was deliberate. Although it may be hard
to acknowledge, executives who are intent on engaging in accounting fraud
will do so no matter how many standards are put in place to stop them.
They will do so especially when the rewards for fraud outweigh the
consequences. Unfortunately, this is the climate and the current corporate
culture within which a "simplified accounting regime" would be introduced.
Consequently, the effort to simplify is bound to fail.
IV. WHERE THE STANDARD-SETTERS ARE TRYING TO GO
The SEC is forming an advisory committee to reduce the complexity of
the United States financial reporting system and make it more "user-
friendly" for investors. 22 A significant body of work and study has already
been done regarding this issue with a number of proposed changes and
reforms already being considered.123 It is expected that the final recom-
122 McTague, supra note 2.
123 See generally FASB RESPONSE, supra note 4 (noting where the report chronicles the research
and reports that have been produced to date regarding revising and reforming accounting standards and
financial statement disclosure).
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mendations will incorporate significant aspects of the work that has already
been done. However, standard-setters should consider the conflict between
preparers and users of financial information in their quest to improve the
current accounting regime. This Article contends that unless and until the
pressure between financial statement preparers and accounting standard-
setters is effectively addressed, any recommendations proposed will be
undermined by corporations' current use of IBC because of the adverse
impact such use has on financial reporting. However, because it is expected
that whatever recommendations are submitted, will in some manner
consider the body of work already completed in this arena, considering that
body of work and assessing its feasibility in light of the current corporate
culture and IBC will be the starting point.
A. The FASB's Three Pronged Attack
The FASB is undertaking a three-pronged effort to revamp the current
accounting and financial reporting regime. The first prong involves re-
addressing current accounting standards that are considered overly complex
and outdated. 124 The standards will presumably be written in a simplified
form, or eliminated altogether. These efforts could be considered along the
lines of preliminary attempts to eliminate the currently cluttered accounting
standard setting landscape.
The second prong consists of three broad initiatives. These include (1)
a massive project to develop a comprehensive integrated codification of all
existing accounting literature organized by subject matter that will become
the single source for all of GAAP;12 1 (2) an attempt to stem the proliferation
of new pronouncements emanating from multiple sources by consolidating
U.S. accounting standard setting under the FASB's auspices;126 and (3) the
third initiative, which is this Article's primary focus, is an attempt to develop
new standards that take a "principles-based" or "objectives-oriented"
approach to accounting standard setting.27
124 FASB RESPONSE, supra note 4 at 7.
125 January 15, 2008 the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued its "FASB Accounting
Standards Codification" project. "The Codification includes all accounting standards issued by a
standard-setter within levels A though D of the current U.S. GAAP hierarchy, including FASB,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), and
related literature. The Codification does not change GAAP; instead it reorganizes the thousands of U.S.
GAAP pronouncements into roughly 90 accounting topics, and displays all topics using a consistent
structure." See FASB news release dated 115/08. Found at www.fasb.org/news/nrOl 1508.shtml. Last
visited May 5, 2008.
126 FASB RESPONSE, supra note 4 at 7.
127 Id.
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The third and final prong involves the FASB's effort to strengthen the
existing "conceptual framework" and to provide a more solid and consistent
foundation for the development of future principles-based standards.'
12
B. Objectives-Oriented Accounting Standards-In General
Up to this point, this Article's focus has revolved around indicting the
current set of accounting standards with its rules-based approach and the
distorted and misleading financial reporting that can stem from such
approach. One of the initiatives currently being considered as an alternative
is objectives-oriented accounting standards.' 29  Generally speaking,
accounting standards that are objectives-oriented (as opposed to the rules-
based standards discussed in Section II), are standards written in a manner
such that the financial preparer is focused on achieving the accounting
objective contained in the standard versus merely focusing on complying
with bright-line tests of form that are evident with rules based accounting
standards. The standard's focus is on representational faithfulness and
economic substance as opposed to mere compliance with the bright-line
tests of form seen, for example, with the operating versus capital lease
accounting treatment decision discussed earlier. Objectives-oriented
accounting standards are standards focused on effective communication of
economic substance versus mere compliance with bright-line tests of form.
C. Objectives-Oriented Accounting Standards-The Detailed Discussion
Before delving into a more detailed discussion of objectives-oriented
accounting standards, it is important to consider the context and the culture
within which these standards will be placed. Importantly, a move away from
a rules-based approach to accounting standards to an objectives-oriented
approach is a move away from the safe-harbors under which financial
statements and their preparers can find refuge from second-guessing
regulators and vigilant enforcers of financial reporting.'3° A move away from
rules-based accounting standards to objectives-oriented accounting
standards is, for some, a move away from a regime characterized by structure
128 Id. at 7-8.
'2 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxiey Act of
2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System ofa Principles-Based Accounting




and certainty into a regime of fluid boundaries which will require both
judgment and discretion on the part of financial statement preparers.
As a result, the objectives-oriented approach to accounting standard
setting attempts to strike the appropriate balance between sufficient structure
and proper flexibility. The approach seeks to provide enough structure and
implementation guidance so that preparers have a sufficient roadmap by
which to navigate. At the same time, the approach looks to provide enough
latitude and flexibility to make sure that the preparer focuses on capturing
the "economic substance" of a transaction versus merely complying with
bright-line tests of form. With this intended balance in mind, objectives-
oriented accounting standards typically involve the following five
characteristics:
"First, in applying a particular standard, preparers and auditors
are required to focus the accounting and attestation decisions on
fulfilling the accounting objective of that standard. This minimizes
the opportunities for financial engineering designed to evade the
standard's intent."131 "Second, each standard is drafted in accor-
dance with objectives set by an overarching, coherent conceptual
framework meant to unify the accounting system as a whole."
32
"Third, the objectives-oriented approach eschews exceptions, which
by their very nature are contrary to fulfilling a principled objective,
create internal inconsistencies within the standard, and, inherently,
create a need for more detailed guidance."
133
Fourth, the objectives-oriented approach also eschews bright-
line tests, which often are a product of the exceptions. These are
inherently contrary to any principled objective, because a slight shift
in the form or structure of a transaction can cause it to move across
the threshold resulting in profoundly different accounting for
transactions that are economically similar.
34
Finally, objectives-oriented standards clearly articulate the class
of transactions to which they apply and contain sufficiently-detailed
guidance so that preparers and auditors have a structure in which to
determine the appropriate accounting for the company's
transactions. In general, the possible degrees of specificity to which
accounting standards may be drafted constitute a spectrum ranging
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Objectives-oriented standards, when properly constructed, land
solidly between the two ends of this spectrum.13 s
Objectives-oriented standards stand in contrast to rules-based
accounting standards, which are characterized by bright-line tests,
multiple exceptions, a high level of detail, and internal inconsisten-
cies. The vision underlying a rules-based approach is to specify the
appropriate accounting treatment for virtually every imaginable
scenario, such that the determination of the appropriate accounting
answer for any situation is straight-forward and, at least in theory,
the extent of professional judgment necessary is minimized.
Ironically, however, significant application of judgment remains
necessary in a rules-based environment. The focus ofthatjudgment,
however, is not on capturing the economic substance of the
transactions or events, but rather it is shifted to the determination of
which of the accounting treatments within a complex maze of scope
exceptions and often conflicting guidance is applicable.'
36
D. SFAS 141-Example of an Objectives-Oriented Accounting Standard
The FASB has already begun drafting new accounting standards with the
objectives-oriented approach in mind. Statement of Financial Accounting
Standard 141 (SFAS 141) is an example. It sets accounting standards in the
context where one entity acquires another,137 what is commonly referred to
as business combinations. 38 Prior to SFAS 141, the standard relating to
accounting for business combinations was a rules-based standard where the
accounting treatment for such combinations was contingent upon the
transaction meeting pre-determined bright-line tests of form. 39 Under the
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF STATEMENT No. 141: BUSINESS
COMBINATIONS (June2001), available at http/www.fasb.org/st/summary/stsuml4l.shtml [hereinafter
FASB No. 141 SUMMARY].
138 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,.EXPOSURE DRAFT: PROPOSED STATEMENT OF FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, BUSINESS COMBINATIONS, A REPLACEMENT OF FASB STATEMENT No.
141, at 1 (June 30, 2005) (on file with the Author) [hereinafter FASB No. 141 EXPOSURE DRAFT]
(defining a business combination as "a transaction or other event in which an acquirer obtains control
of one or more businesses").
139 FASB NO. 141 SUMMARY, supra note 137 ("Under Opinion 16, business combinations were
accounted for using one of two methods, the pooling-of-interests method (pooling method) or the
purchase method. Use of the pooling method was required whenever 12 criteria were met; otherwise,
the purchase method was to be used. Because those 12 criteria did not distinguish economically
dissimilar transactions, similar business combinations were accounted for using different methods that
produced dramatically different financial results.").
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accounting standards that were in place prior to SFAS 141, there were two
potential accounting treatment possibilities: (1) the purchase (or acquisition)
accounting method; or (2) the pooling of interests accounting method."0
The purchase method of accounting requires that CompanyA account
for the acquisition of Company B as a purchase of Company B's assets and
an assumption of Company B's liabilities.' 41 'What is significant to the
buying company when using the purchase method of accounting is how the
assets are valued when ownership is transferred from Company B to
Company A. Under the purchase method of accounting, the buying and
selling companies come to an agreement as to the purchase price. The
purchase price invariably will exceed the amount at which those assets are
carried on Company B's balance sheet, as those amounts will be carried at
book value (cost minus depreciation), rather than at fair market value. 42
Accordingly, under the purchase method of accounting, the acquiring
company will be required to "bump up" the cost basis of those assets to
reflect their fair market value. 43 The implications of such asset revaluations
are that the acquiring company will have to record those revalued assets on
its balance sheet and depreciate them accordingly. This will result in greater
depreciation expense for example, which will result in lower reported
income. As a result, companies thatwere sensitive to such income statement
effects, prior to SFAS 141, would attempt to structure the transaction by
using the pooling of interests accounting method instead.
Under the second accounting treatment the business combination of the
two companies is perceived quite differently. The pooling of interests
method has no acquiring or acquired companies per se. Rather, under the
pooling of interest method, the two companies are treated simply as if they
have merged into one.'" Accordingly, instead of revaluing the assets and
bumping them up to their fair market values, the two entities are reported
on a consolidated basis, with the asset book values of the respective
companies remaining at their pre-merger balances. 45
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., BRAGG, supra note 16, at 470-73.
142 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles requires that assets be recorded at cost and then
reduced periodically by the amount of depreciation recorded each period.
143 For an introduction to the purchase method of accounting for business combinations, see
CHARLES H. MEYER, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR LAWYERS INANUTSHELL 352-58 (3d ed. 2006).
W44 FASB Rules Out Pooling of Interests, J. ACCT. (July 1999), available at
httpV'/www.aicpa.org/PUBS/jofa/jul1999 (follow Financial Accounting hyperlink) ("Using the pooling-
of-interests method, companies could add together the book values of their net assets without indicating
which entity was the 'purchaser' and which was the 'purchased.' When this method was used, investor
often had difficulty telling who was buying whom or determining how to evaluate the transactions.").
145 MEYER, supra note 143, at 353.
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Under the standards prior to SFAS 141, corporations would attempt to
structure their transactions depending on the accounting treatment that best
suited their desired outcome. In some cases the purchase method of
accounting would be used, while in others the pooling of interests method
would be most desired. Such alternative accounting treatments were
considered problematic, however, since business combinations could be
afforded very different accounting treatments in spite of the fact that there
were no substantive differences in the transactions."46 Such representational
inconsistencies were similar to the operating versus capital lease distinctions
discussed earlier and resulted in similar objections.
Accordingly, SFAS 141 was drafted to address the issue of inconsistent
accounting treatment in the area of business combinations. What is special
and unique about SFAS 141 is that it substituted a rules based standard for
an objectives-oriented approach to accounting standard setting. In that
regard SFAS 141 is drafted to do a number of things: (1) force financial
statement preparers to use the same accounting treatment for transactions
that are substantively the same; (2) force financial statement preparers to
focus on reporting the economic substance of a transaction versus merely
focusing on making sure the transaction adheres to bright-line tests of form;
and (3) provide preparers with enough implementation guidance so that the
standard can be consistently applied with certainty and confidence by the
financial statement preparer.
In adhering to these three objectives, SFAS 141 starts off by stating its
accounting objective as follows:
OBJECTIVE
This Statement requires that all business combinations be accounted for
by applying the acquisition method. A business combination is a transaction
or other event in which an acquirer obtains control of one or more businesses
(the afcuiree). In accordance with the acquisition method, the acquirer
measures and recognizes the acquiree, as a whole, and the assets acquired and
liabilities assumed at their fair values as of the acquisition date.47
146 FASB No. 141 SUMMARY, supra note 137 ("Under Opinion 16, business combinations were
accounted for using one of two methods, the pooling-of-interests method (pooling method) or the
purchase method. Use of the pooling method was required whenever 12 criteria were met; otherwise,
the purchase method was to be used. Because those 12 criteria did not distinguish economically
dissimilar transactions, similar business combinations were accounted for using different methods that
produced dramatically different financial results.").
147 FASB No. 141 ExPosuREDRAFr, supra note 138, at 1 (defining the objective ofthe standard).
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By stating the standard's objective up front, SFAS 141 clearly defines the
scope of the transaction type that comes under its purview. In accordance
with the stated objective, all business combinations are now subject to the
accounting guidance of SFAS 141. Thus, those business combinations that
under the old standard may have qualified for either the purchase or pooling
accounting methods depending on the transaction's characteristics will now
be subject to the mandates of SFAS 141. Accordingly, SFAS 141 eliminates
the need for bright-line tests and rule based exceptions where alternative
accounting treatments could be considered.
Indeed, SFAS 141 has no bright-line tests or compliance rules. The goal
in drafting the standard without these bright-line tests was to force the
financial statement preparer to focus on the accounting standard's objective
which is simply to account for all business combinations using the
acquisition method. Accordingly, the standard removes the prospect of
"financial engineering." The financial statement preparer may no longer
consider structuring the transaction to qualify for pooling versus purchase
accounting treatment because alternative treatments are no longer available.
The focus is now narrowed to purchase accounting treatment only and is
applicable and required in all business combinations. Finally, under SFAS
141, there is more than adequate implementation guidance, such that
financial statement preparers have sufficient guidance in most scenarios to
implement the standard properly.'48
E. IBC and Objectives-Oriented Accounting Standards-Where the Two
Fail to Meet
The success of implementing objectives-oriented accounting standards
is contingent on financial statement preparers exercising properjudgment.
Whereas under the rules-based system, both the preparer and the enforcer
used the rule's bright-line tests to determine whether the preparer was
compliant, objectives-oriented standards contain no such bright lines. In
fact, such bright-line tests are eschewed to prevent the preparer from
engaging in the practice of financial engineering.' 49
Accordingly, the resulting regime arguably could lead to more abuse
rather than less by financial statement preparers due to the wider latitude
granted by the process. In sum, the success of objectives-oriented
accounting standards is contingent upon financial statement prepares
focusing on capturing the economic substance of a transaction rather than
148 Id. (for example, see Appendix A: Implementation Guidance A1-A136).
149 SEC Section 108(d) Study, supra note 129.
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on presenting bad financial information in the best light possible. However,
given the current compensation and reporting climate, such an assumption
is premature at best.
The same temptations that existed under the rules based regime will still
exist in an objectives-oriented accounting standard environment. Preparers
who are intent on circumnavigating a rule that is contrary to their financial
reporting objective will do so regardless of the standard in place. Certainly
there are some areas of financial reporting where this is more of a concern
than others. For example, SFAS 141 is an accounting standard that
"funnels" the preparer into one and only one option when accounting for
business combinations which is the purchase method of accounting. But
how would a revised standard using the objectives-oriented approach work
when dealing with the operating versus capital lease dilemma for example?
Removing the bright-line tests set forth in SFAS 13 and leaving the
judgment in the hands of the financial statement preparers gives preparers
a considerable amount of latitude, and no clear indication as to where the
parameters begin and end. The blurred line under an objectives-oriented
accounting regime coupled with the ever-present tension that IBC builds
into the process may never bring the vision that standard-setters have for
objectives-oriented accounting standards into proper focus.
F. Effective Enforcement as a Counter-Agent
Proponents of the objectives-oriented approach and the standard-setters
themselves suggest that the proper counter-agent in ensuring that objectives-
oriented accounting standards are implemented properly are the
corporation's independent accountants and the corporation's audit
committee. 150 In light of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002,
proponents of the objectives-oriented approach believe that rigorous
enforcement by these two gate-keeping factions will ensure an overall
effective implementation of objectives-oriented accounting standards.''
How this dynamic between objectives-oriented accounting standards
and rigorous enforcement actually plays out in practice remains to be seen.
At this juncture, only historical data can be used to predict future events.
And, what that historical data suggests is that even with all the gate-keeping
factions through which financial information is vetted, namely internal




committee, and the SEC, accounting fraud has been a prominent fixture of
the corporate landscape.
In fairness, the question then becomes whether, in the shadow of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the heightened vigilance that stems from that Act,
objectives-oriented accounting standards will be successfully implemented.
The answer depends on how much of a priority sound financial reporting
is, and what those involved in the process are willing to do to achieve this
objective.
V. How TO APPROACH-WHAT COULD OR SHOULD BE DONE?
Historical data suggests that true and effective implementation of
objectives-oriented standard setting may only be achieved when the tension
between users and preparers of financial statements is properly addressed.
The question that remains, however, is how?
If the true goal of financial reporting is to create an accounting regime
that consistently and on a widespread basis creates financial statements that
effectively communicate, are representationally faithful, and truly depict the
economic substance of their respective corporations, then the overall
paradigm that overlays the financial reporting paradigm needs to shift.
A. The "Stick" Approach versus the "Carrot" Approach
Currently, the accounting and financial reporting regime is premised on
a "stick" approach. The foundational blocks on which the stick approach is
built is a model of negative reinforcement. Under the current stick
approach, a main motivation for "doing it right" is to avoid punishment or
prosecution. Currently, financial preparers are faced with a whole host of
civil and criminal penalties depending on the depth, breadth, severity and in
some cases the mens rea related to an accounting or financial reporting error
or irregularity.5 2 Accordingly, the primary incentive for getting the
financials "right" or more accurately, staying within the confines of GAAP,
is to avoid the "stick."
152 For instance, those that were involved in the Enron accounting scandal received sentences
ranging from one year to twenty-four years, depending on their level of involvement and the severity of
their transgression. For example, Lea Fastow received a one year sentence for failing to report on her
tax return income she received from an Enron side deal, butJeffrey Skilling received a twenty-four year
sentence for various fraud and securities law violations. See Enron Chronicle Special Website, supra note
93 (follow hyperlink for "Jeffrey Skilling" in the "Prosecution Scoreboard" section of the page).
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B. The Problems with the "Stick" Approach
The problem with the stick approach, however, is that it places financial
statement preparers and financial statement users at odds. Presently, the
preparer's focus is to present the financial statements as favorably as possible.
In some cases, this focus results in the preparer engaging in either aggressive
accounting tactics which at the very least compromise the financial
statement's representational faithfulness, or in the more extreme cases
engaging in outright accounting fraud. Under the stick approach, the goal
and focus for many financial statement preparers is not on getting the
financial statements right, but on not being discovered getting them wrong.
This dynamic creates an approach to accounting standard setting that results
in financial statements that do not effectively convey a corporation's true
economic substance in a way that can be readily understood by the users of
such information. Instead, accounting standards such as SFAS 13 are drafted
in an attempt to prevent preparers from "engineering" accounting results
that are not based upon or focused on their respective corporation's true
economic reality.
153
With the stick approach, preparers have less incentive to report poor
financial information accurately. In fact, with the specter of IBC, the
executive's incentive is to push the financial reporting envelope as much as
possible because of his vested personal interest in what is depicted in those
reports. True, the stick approach may catch some in its net. But as discussed
above, executives play the probabilities. And the probability of getting
caught often seems smaller than the probability that the preparer will suffer
immediate and personal financial adversity through the reporting of poor
financial information accurately.
Accordingly, the problem with the stick approach is that it requires
standard-setters to draft accounting standards from a "defensive" posture in
anticipation that preparers will try to push the envelope, or in some cases
tear it up altogether. And because of the relatively small enforcement net
relative to the over 13,000 publicly held companies that could potentially
engage in accounting fraud of one sort or another, a strong argument exists
that the stick approach is not the best method to accomplish widespread
financial reporting that is focused on "getting it right."
153 For example, see discussion on capital versus operating lease in Section III of this paper.
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C. The "Carrot" Approach-A Proposed New Paradigm in the Accounting
and Financial Reporting Regime
1. THE PREMISE IN THEORY
As an alternative to the stick approach, this Article proposes what will be
referred to as the "carrot" approach. The idea behind the carrot approach is
to create a new set of incentives for those who prepare financial statements.
Presently, with the stick approach, the incentives are either do it right or not
get caught doing it wrong, and with the overlay of IBC, many financial
statement preparers are choosing the route of not getting caught doing it
wrong. In contrast, the aim of the carrot approach is to re-align the financial
statement preparer's incentives by creating a positive reinforcement
mechanism for getting the financial statements right; it is a shift from
negative reinforcement-the stick-to positive reinforcement-the carrot.
This paradigm shift ideally would create reverberating effects on the
accounting and financial reporting process as well as the accounting
standards that define and shape the parameters of that process. First, instead
of financial statement preparers spending countless hours figuring out how
they can "game" the financial reporting process, the carrot approach would
engender the primary focus of presenting accurate financial information,
whether good or bad in a manner that is both understandable and is a true
and accurate depiction of the corporation's economic position.
Likewise, regarding accounting standard-setting, the carrot approach
would relieve standard-setters from the burden of having to draft accounting
standards defensively. Presently, accounting standards such as SFAS 13 are
drafted in anticipation of preparers trying to account for long-term lease
transactions in such a way that presents the financial statements in the best
light possible, even if the true economic substance of the transaction is
sacrificed as a result. Because of the preparer's motivations behind financial
statement manipulation, the standard-setters are forced into the compromise
of bright-line tests that, at the very least, draw a line in the accounting sand
that indicates where the far end of the boundary lies.' With the financial
statement preparer's incentives realigned to match the goals of the standard-
setters, the need for such defensive drafting would be alleviated.
1s4 See, e.g., FASB No. 13, supra note 49, V 7 at 8.
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2. WHAT POSSIBLE "CARROT" APPROACHES EXIST?
The question then is what forms might a carrot based approach take?
Simply removing IBC as a component of executive compensation may create
the desired result of alleviating the tension on the financial reporting
process. With the prospect of the financial statement preparer having no
personal stake in the outcome, at least not one tied to compensation, the
preoccupation with the actual results and presenting those results in the best
light possible are removed.
Though this idea does have its merits, not the least of which being its
simplicity, it is doubtful whether simply removing IBC would take away the
tension. Even if incentives were not part of an executive compensation
structure, an executive's fortunes would likely still be tied to the company's
performance as depicted in the financial statements. Accordingly, even if
IBC based on financial performance were removed from the equation,
executives would still feel the pressure of presenting the financial
information in as favorable a light as possible and the pressures and
temptations to be aggressive or fraudulent would still exist.
IBC creates incentives for executives to engage in aggressive accounting
tactics or outright accounting fraud. An alternative this Article considers is
making a portion ofan executive's compensation contingent upon the extent
to which financial reports are clear, user friendly, and give a fair depiction
of the company's financial position. In other words, use IBC to reward
executives based on the accuracy of financial reports. By incentivizing
financial statement accuracy instead of financial statement performance, you
remove the emphasis placed on performance and you redirect that emphasis
appropriately toward accuracy. Thus, the incentive to engage in aggressive
or fraudulent accounting tactics is lessened and the incentive for accurate
financial reporting is enhanced.
D. How Would Incentivizing Accurate Financial Reporting Work in
Practice?
Under this incentivizing approach, in lieu of granting stock options, a
portion of an executive's compensation would be based on "accurate"
financial reporting. The percentage would be a fluid one depending on the
circumstances, but the amount should be significant enough to motivate the
executive into giving the exercise appropriate attention and care towards
"getting the numbers right." 20 to 25% of an executive's total compensation
would seem appropriate.
The next question asks who will bear the costs of this incentivized
approach. One of the lures of stock option grants is that the compensation
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does not come from a direct draw on the corporation's assets but through
the realization of shares that have increased in value. If executives are
compensated for accurate financial reporting, this is something that would
come directly from corporate coffers instead of the market. Although this
may be met with resistance, the question then becomes what value do we
place on accurate financial reporting. We can take a short look back in
history to see the price shareholders have paid as a result of deceptive
accounting. In hindsight, what would those shareholders have been willing
to pay had they known that Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco were in dire
financial straits? How much money might many of these shareholders have
saved if they had known sooner rather than later that these corporation's
financial situations were other than what was being depicted in their finan-
cial statements? The point here is to pay a little more now instead of poten-
tially paying much more later through failing to act due to misinformation.
1. WHAT IS "AccuRATE" FINANCIAL REPORTING?
Accounting, in many instances, isjust as much art as it is science, where
for any number of transactions, there can be more than one accounting
approach that would be considered acceptable and in compliance with
GAAP. Accordingly, this notion of "accuracy" is a moving target. What is
contemplated and hoped for by this carrot proposal is not 100% accuracy in
financial reporting, but rather an approach that changes management's
mindset when it comes to financial statement preparing and reporting. A
premise of objectives-oriented accounting standards is that it requires that
financial statement preparers focus on reporting the "economic substance"
of a transaction rather than mere compliance with bright-line tests of form
which were commonplace under the rules-based regime. Further, it should
be appreciated that objectives-oriented accounting standards do provide
extensive implementation guidance. Accordingly, the preparer will have a
sufficient road-map to follow when accounting for a transaction while at the
same time remaining within the confines of GAAP. Incentivizing accurate
financial reporting attempts to direct the preparer's focus to work within
those boundaries and capture the economic substance of a transaction
(whether good or bad), instead of focusing on circumnavigating the standard
altogether. The implementation guidance within these standards will let the
preparer know whether he is accounting for a transaction within boundaries
and therefore is capturing the economic substance ofa transaction. So when
we are talking about accuracy, we are talking about working effectively
within the confines of these objective-oriented standards and recording
transactions in such a manner that they are a fair reflection of that
transaction's economic substance.
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2. How WOULD RESULTS BE QUANTIFIED? WHO WOULD MAKE THE
DETERMINATION?
This carrot proposal would not be one mandated by law. Any means
other than voluntary compliance would, for obvious reasons, be an invasive
encroachment on a corporation's autonomous decisions regarding employee
compensation. Accordingly, practical implementation of such a proposal
would require cooperative buy-in from a number of constituencies, chiefly
the company's board of directors, the faction responsible for setting
executive compensation.
The board of directors would also be responsible for determining
whether the executives adhered to the tenants of sound financial reporting
and whether they successfully captured the economic substance of the
financial position of their respective corporations clearly and coherently.
Latitude would be given as to how exactly this determination would be
made. But what is contemplated is that the board's audit committee will
work in conjunction with the corporation's independent auditors to assess
the quality of management's financial representations as a whole. The
auditors would determine whether there are areas where management is
taking an aggressive position as to certain transactions and whether that
position is one that lends more to economic truth or obfuscated distortion.
To the extent management adhered to these tenants would be the extent to
which they would receive the "financial reporting" portion of their
compensation. With the auditors, management, and the board presumably
on the same side of the reporting fence with the same objective in mind
(economically true financial reporting), the fears of accounting fraud and
that such fraud would be missed by the auditors is of less concern.
E. Anticipated Opposition to This Approach
This proposed change in approach goes against the grain of what has
been customary in accounting and financial reporting practices. But what
it comes down to is the priority of sound financial reporting. Several
objections exist
1. The first reaction to this proposed approach of paying for accuracy is
that it de-emphasizes performance and instead merely focuses on accuracy.
This criticism would be akin to saying, "we don't care if you lose the game,
as long as you get the score right." In a system where performance and
results ultimately are the bottom line, it would seem that rewarding
executives for quality financial reporting would be rewarding them for that
which should already be a standard component of their job. While this
criticism may be valid, one must remain focused on the ultimate goal and
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the means for achieving it. If the goal truly is a better, more accurate, user
friendly, accounting and financial reporting regime where fraud is less
prevalent, then those who preside over and are involved in the process need
to take innovative approaches to achieve those goals.
Another way of looking at this criticism is from a criminal law analogy.
In other words, isn't paying executives not to commit financial fraud akin to
paying one who would otherwise rob a convenience store not to rob it? In
essence, good behavior is being extorted. But these two behaviors can be
distinguished by highlighting several major differences. In the case of the
individual who would otherwise rob the convenience store, the impact ofhis
actions is localized. The store owner suffers the harm of having his store
robbed. There may be some collateral harm to those customers that
frequent the store. The store owner may have to charge higher prices for
added security perhaps and to offset the cost of theft. But even in this
situation, the impact is relatively constrained.
In contrast, the actions of a team of executives who preside over a
publicly held corporation that literally can have billions of outstanding
shares held by millions of shareholders, impacts considerably more
people.' 55 Money for retirement, pensions, and college funds are all tied up
in these shares. In these instances when the dark specter of accounting fraud
finally comes to light, the impact can be widespread and devastating.
Because of the higher stakes involved and the potentially far reaching effects,
progressive and unconventional approaches may be necessary. Accordingly,
creating the incentive for quality financial reporting may be a way to achieve
this objective.
2. Another objection to this proposed change is that a changed emphasis
from performance to accuracy will cause corporate performance to suffer.
initially, the purpose behind IBC was to align executives' interests with
shareholders. Given our corporate climate, it is not a stretch to conclude
that moves away from actions that seemingly de-emphasize performance
will be met with resistance. What incentives do executives have to perform
if their incentives are removed?
This question can be answered by analyzing whether stock options truly
provide the incentives they were designed to create. As has been discussed
above, many assumptions rooted in stock options as a form of compensation
are flawed. The major assumption being that managers will carry out the
accounting and financial reporting function with the utmost integrity and
focus on quality regardless of whether that news is good or bad, and
155 Home Depot, for example, had 2,117,846,411 shares of common stock outstanding as of
March 28, 2006. HD PROXY STATEMENT 2006, supra note 7, at 1.
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regardless of whether such actions may have an adverse impact on their
personal fortunes. These assumptions are flawed because they fail to
consider all the variables that go into human decision-making and how that
human "decision-tree" may branch in different directions, depending on
myriad of variables that could never be captured in an IBC model through
the use of stock options.
3. Admittedly, paying executives for accurate financial reporting is still
a form of IBC, however there is a great difference between incentivizing
accuracy instead of performance. Incentivizing an executive based on
corporate performance is more of a "wild card" because many variables go
into a corporation's ultimate performance, some of which are under the
executive's control and some of which are not. Incentivizing an executive
based on financial reporting on the other hand is more of a closed-ended
proposition, because the executive can hit the mark every time merely
through vigilant financial reporting. Accordingly, the pressures that exist in
the corporate performance arena, particularly when the corporation is not
performing, will never exist for accurate financial reporting. Accurate
financial reporting will always be under the executive's control. The
numbers will always have a "right" answer. The incentive will simply be
based on reporting those results accurately, whatever they happen to be.
4. Another concern is what mechanisms will insure and maintain
performance. Under the ideal scenario, executive performance and financial
statement integrity co-exist in relative harmony. Achieving this perfect
alliance requires delving into what motivates managers and executives to
perform well. Is it merely the prospect of compensation or additional
compensation through incentive payments that causes executives to raise the
level of their performance, or are there other more effective means by which
this can be done?
The answer is that the incentive to perform well will always be built into
any employer-employee relationship because one who does not perform
well will ultimately lose hisjob. This applies to all positions throughout an
organization, including the CEO. Incentivizing performance through the
use of stock options merely creates another variable that often diverts execu-
tives from focusing on actual results to focusing on accounting results
instead.
Accordingly, there may always be some incentive for preparers to
present financial information in the best possible light, even if the specter of
stock options is removed from the equation. An executive's performance
will always be judged in part based on the corporation's financial
performance. What is hoped for and anticipated is that incentivizing
accurate financial reporting will have a counteractive effect on aggressive
accounting tactics or accounting fraud sufficient enough to stifle such
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practices. The bottom line is executives who are not performing, will, at
some point, be forced out. Removing stock options ideally takes away some
of the motivation for misrepresenting financial information; likewise,
incentivizing accurate financial reporting ideally turns the dial in the other
direction.
F. The Public Accountants-Isn't Keeping Financial Statement Preparers in
Line the Auditor's Job?
As a final variable to this equation, we should look at the public
accountants and their responsibility as auditors of publicly held companies.
Independent auditors serve an important role in the financial reporting
process. In theory, they act as the "first line of defense" in insuring the
integrity of the financial reporting process. They perform this task by
auditing the financial statements of publicly held companies and then
expressing an opinion as to whether those financial statements "present fairly
in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations" of
the company they have been tasked to audit."6
Scholarly Articles have been written on the public accountant's role in
the financial reporting process and its effectiveness in insuring financial
statement integrity. 1 7 But the public's perception of an accountant's role
and what an accountant actually does are quite different. The public's
perceptions as to what occurs with a financial statement audit is that
scrutinizing, highly trained accounting professionals descend on a company,
vet every transaction through their discerning lens, and insure that the
financial statements are 100% accurate. But if this is indeed what happens,
then why are accounting fraud and securities law violations still so prevalent?
On any given day, the public hears reports about yet another CEO or CFO
being charged with or settling charges related to accounting or financial
fraud. 8 The answer to this comes in appreciating the difference between
156 For example, Home Depot's 2005 Annual Report included its Form 10-K, where the auditors
(here, the firm of KPMG) express an opinion as to whether Home Depot's financial statements present
fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the corporation. See HD 2005 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 34.
137 See, e.g., Gregory L. Paul, Not Biting the Hand that Feeds You: PubicAccounting Firms and Conflicts
of Interest, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 325 (2004).
158 See, e.g., Three Former Gas Distributor Execs Sued by SEC Over Earnings, Revenue, 39 SEC. REG.
&L. REP. (BNA) 1262, Aug. 13,2007, available at httpV/pubs.ban.com/ip/bna/SRLR.NSF/eh/ab4z6j4uO
("The Securities and Exchange Commission sued three former senior officers of Nicor Inc. Aug. 9 in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, saying they engaged in or approved actions
at the company that resulted in the false appearance that the concern had met earnings goals and
increased corporate revenues (SEC v. Fisher, 8/9/07 N.D. Ill., 07-C-4483).").
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what is perceived to be occurring in financial statement audits and what
actually occurs.
1. THE "BusINEss" OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDITING
Over time, the practice of public accounting and the methods and
manner by which accountants completed the important task of financial
statement audits have changed. In the early years, the practice of public
accounting was considered a profession that was highly revered, and those
who chose to be a part of the profession carried the torch with reverence and
a focus on adhering to the highest levels of professional and ethical standards
when engaging in financial statement audits. 15 9 Time and cost considera-
tions in completing the audits were secondary to the all important task of
making sure the audit was performed with a high level of healthy skepticism
and the appropriate depth and breadth of coverage to insure financial
statement integrity. Further, the relationship between the auditor and the
corporation being audited was not, in most cases, adversarial but was at a
sufficient arms-length such that the auditor's objectivity and professional
skepticism were not compromised.
The pressures of the marketplace, however, began chipping away at the
walls that previously insulated public accounting from the market pressures
affecting other facets of the economy. Specifically, the rise of envy caused
the once noble and selfless public accounting professional to ask the
question, "what about me?" The business consultant changed the public
auditor's role and prestige."6 Whereas the auditor was a necessary evil of
sorts, something the corporation was forced to tolerate because financial
statement audits were mandated by the securities laws, the consultants were
seen as "white knights" who rode in with their laptops and spreadsheets and,
with their savvy business advice and expertise, advised companies on how
to stream-line their business processes, cut costs, and maximize profits.
Because of the value added nature of the services these consultants provided,
they were able to command superior fees to those of the auditors.
Meanwhile the auditors were relegated to the backroom to pore over reams
of financial data for the mere purpose of attesting to their accuracy.
This dynamic inevitably caused auditors to shift the practice of public
accounting from profession to business. 161 Public accountants, believing
their expertise and business acumen to be on par if not superior to their





consulting counterparts, began engaging in the practice of consulting as
well. 62 Accordingly, with this added dimension of consulting and the
corresponding riches and notoriety that came with it, the auditor's once sole
focus on performing the audit and performing it properly became diluted.
Further, the role that the audit function played in the overall relationship
between the auditor and the corporation evolved as well. The audit function
became a mere commodity for both the corporation and the auditor alike.
All public companies needed one, and all public accountants could perform
one. The public accountants who performed audits for the large public
accounting firms coalesced into what was then eight major accounting firms,
in the 1970s to the late 1980s," 3 which further merged into the "Big Six"
from 1989-1998,' 6 and are now presently the "Big Four."
65
2. THE EFFECT ON AUDIT QUALITY
Instead of public accountants differentiating themselves on the quality
of their audits, the depth and breadth of their account testing, the level of
training, and professional expertise of their associates, price became the big
delineator."6 Each firm competed to see who could perform the audit in the
least amount of time for the least expense. The firms that excelled at
accomplishing this goal would garner the business. As a result, the audit
function merely played the role of "loss leader" for the public accountants.67
162 Id.
163 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need
to Restructure the Industry Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1698 (2006). The eight major accounting
firms during the '70's and late '80's were Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young & Company, Coopers &
Lybrand, Ernst & Whinney (formerly Ernst & Ernst), Haskins & Sells (merged with the European firm
Deloitte Plender Griffiths to become Deloitte, Haskins' and Sells), KPMG (formed by merger of Peat
Marwick International and KMG Group), Price Waterhouse, and Touche Ross. Id. at 1700.
164 See id. Competition among these public accounting firms intensified and the Big 8 became
the Big 6 in 1989 when Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young to form Ernst & Young in June,
and Deloitte, Haskins & Sells merged with Touche Ross to form Deloitte & Touch in August. Id. at
1701-04.
165 See id. Presently, the "Big Four" consist ofPricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst &Young,
and Deloitte and Touche.
166 James L Craig, Jr., The Business ofPublic Accounting, CPAJ. (Aug. 1994), http'//www.nysscpa.
org/cpajournaVold/15702999.htm. In the article, accounting professionals discuss the bidding process
for audit engagements:
Let's assume we all want the diamond client. We can't compete with Neil on knowledge, so
we bid the $23,000. But suppose it is for a client in an industry with which we are all familiar.
Ifwe all bid $23,000 that is what the client will pay. But ifwe all bid $35,000, that is what the
fee will be. We beat ourselves up. Why do we do it?"
Id.
167 Id. The bidding process used by accounting professionals can be described as follows:
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The public accountants would lowball the audit bid and perform the audit
for only a marginal profit-at a break-even point or even a loss-to get the
business with the hope and expectation being that once they got their foot
in the door, they would be able to sell additional consulting business that
would be more lucrative.' 68 The effect that this dynamic had on the method
by which public accountants performed their audits was detrimental. In
sum, the auditor's focus, as it related to the audit function, shifted from
"getting it right" to "getting it done." Accordingly, auditors began to devise
ways by which they could justify shrinking the scope of their testing and
account balance verification protocols by doing things such as "risk
assessment analysis," a process by which an auditor limits or extends the
amount of effort involved in verifying an account balance based on the
determined risk that the account in question may be misstated.' 69 As a result
of these risk assessment analysis, it is not uncommon for an auditor to test
less than 5% or smaller percentages of a given account and conclude that the
account is fairly stated. With these dynamics and factors playing into the
audit process, it is easier to see how companies can achieve certain account-
ing results regardless of the actual financial results while circumnavigating
the auditors in the process. As one accounting professional noted, "A good
crook can fool a good auditor every day of the week."' 70
Some would argue that newly enacted provisions contained in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that now prohibit public accountants from acting in the
dual role as accountants and consultants will prevent these breakdowns in
the gate-keeping function that in part allowed accounting indiscretions such
as those perpetrated by Enron and WorldCom to persist undetected. 171 In
the short run, prohibiting auditors from providing consulting services in
addition to performing the audit is a positive step in improving financial
We as a profession have to find a way to make the audit more valuable. We have made the
audit a loss leader to get access to a client. What would happen if we said to clients, we will
do an audit, but we won't do consulting? The idea of knowing the client from having done
the audit, and being in a better position to do the consulting is not relevant today ....
Id.
168 Id.
169 HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 110, at 229. As noted in the text, the extent to which the
auditors will actually look at supporting documentation to verify an account balance is based on their risk
assessment and the extent to which they deem that company's internal controls to be reliable. Id.
170 Craig, supra note 166.
171 For example, Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act expressly prohibits nine types of"non-
audit" services in which public accountants regularly engaged prior to the Act's enactment. Those
activities are: (1) bookkeeping services; (2) financial information systems design;(3) appraisal or valuation
services; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management functions or
human resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; (8) legal
services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and (9) any other service that the (Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board) determines to be impermissible. 15 U.S.C. S 78j-l(g) (2006).
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statement integrity. But healthy skepticism should remain about the overall
effectiveness that an audit has in insuring that the financial statements are
stated fairly "in all material respects." Presently, audits still remain more of
a perceived check on financial statement integrity rather than an actual one.
The accounting profession is still one that has evolved into and remains a
business rather than a profession. Accordingly, the price pressures and the
commodity-like nature of the audit function still remain and therefore the
focus of "get it done" versus "get it right" remains as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
For years, accounting standard-setters have been waging the battle
against financial fraud and obfuscated and distorted financial reporting. This
Article looks at one dynamic that is integral to improving this process.
Specifically, IBC that rewards on the basis of financial performance is
entrenched in our corporate culture and the probability of removing it may
be considered remote. In many cases, IBC based on financial performance
creates the incentive to distort, obfuscate, or in many cases, commit financial
accounting fraud. Accordingly, this Article provides a new perspective to a
chronic and systemic problem of distorted financial reporting. The
suggested approach is to incentivize financial statement accuracy rather than
financial statement performance. Such a modification would remove the
tension in the reporting process and put all those involved on the same side
of the fence and working toward the same goal. While some may consider
what is being proposed here as drastic or untenable, the question must be
asked: what is the goal and what are those involved in the process willing to
do to get there? Trying to implement an accounting regime that is supposed
to be simplified, more user friendly, and permeated with objectives-oriented
accounting standards, can only be achieved by changing the focus of those
involved with the process. This Article proposes a novel solution to
implement these goals. Until priorities for executives are switched, the
tensions that exist now will remain, and the likelihood of achieving the lofty
goals being set by the standard-setters will remain just that.
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